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Abstract
This paper studies the manner in which central bank transparency has been implemented in Indonesia, and the
impact of transparency on the central bank’s performance in achieving its goals. First, a normative analysis is
conducted to seek the regulatory framework for central bank transparency. Secondly, a performance analysis
is carried out to observe the extent to which central bank transparency has been implemented in Indonesia,
and the impact it brings on the central bank’s performance in conducting monetary policy. Finally, an
international practice analysis is performed to set a benchmark based on the manner in which transparency
has been implemented by other central banks.
Keywords: central bank, transparency, law and regulations of Indonesia, inflation, financial stabilization
Abstrak
Tulisan ini mengkaji cara penerapan transparansi bank yang telah diterapkan di Indonesia, dan dampak
transparansi performa bank sentral dalam mencapai tujuannya. Pertama, analisis normatif dilakukan untuk
menemukan kerangka peraturan terkait transparansi bank sentral. Kedua, analisis performa dilakukan untuk
mengamati sejauh mana transparasi bank sentral telah diimplementasikan di Indonesia, dan dampaknya
terhadap performa bank sentral dalam melaksanakan kebijakan moneternya. Terakhir, analisis atas praktik
internasional dilakukan untuk menetapkan tolok ukur transparansi yang telah diterapkan oleh bank sentral
lainnya.
Kata kunci: bank sentral, transparansi, hukum dan regulasi Indonesia, inflasi, stabilitas finansial
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I. INTRODUCTION
Transparency is a universal notion. The existing literature on central bank
transparency is, in general, numerous.1 There is a growing literature on the impact of
transparency on the ability of the central bank to achieve its goals.2 Such studies often
deal with the independence and accountability of the central bank, with a crosscut
analysis between economic, politic, and public policy. The questions are always
whether airing the secrets of the temple3 has a positive impact on the central bank
and, if yes, what amount of transparency will be optimal. Can transparency go too far
for a central bank? Svensson (2003), for instance, is among the prominent proponents
to argue that transparency has a positive effect on the central bank in achieving its
objectives.4 Increased transparency may also lead to greater support for the central
bank as experienced by the Bank of England and the Bank of Canada.5
Transparency promotes democracy of a country, in the sense that it compels to
clarity in the operations of the executive and legislative bodies. Also, it fosters the
accountability of these agencies to their stakeholders, including ultimately the
citizens they represent.6 This is in line with the arguments of Hancher and Larouche
that regulatory decisions by the executive and legislative bodies must be made in a
manner that there is no explicit controversy among the market participants.7 In other
words, where transparency and its integral elements including openness, a duty to
state reasons and the possibility of review, and the independence of the decisionmaker are preserved.
In a broader scope, Hanretty, Larouche, and Reindl (2012) argue that if
transparency by public authorities and disclosure mechanisms functions well, it
may reduce the formal sanctions imposed by such authorities so that, in the end,
it can increase their accountability.8 However, Miskhin (2004) argues that central
bank transparency can be excessive.9 So does Goodhart (2001), for instance pointing
out that the announcement of central bank policy projections can complicate the
decision-making process.10 This reason was also the justification for the ECB to refuse
to publish the minutes and voting records of the board.11 Hence, it is crucial for a
1
See for instance Ben S. Bernanke, et. al. Inflation targeting: Lessons from the international experience
(Priceton: Princeton University Press, 1999); C. A. Goodhart. Monetary transmission lags and the formulation of the policy decision on interest rates (Boston: Springer, 2001), pp. 205-228; S. Eijffinger & P. Geraats,
“How transparent are Central Banks?” Centre for Economic Policy Research, London, Discussion Paper, No.
3188, 2002; and F. S. Mishkin, “Can central bank transparency go too far?” National Bureau of Economic
Research, No. w10829, 2004.
2
N. Dincer and B. Eichengreen, “Central bank transparency: causes, consequences and updates,” Theoretical Inquiries in Law 11, no. 1 (2010), pp. 75-123.
3
W. Greider, Secrets of the Temple (New York: Simon & Shuster, 1987). In this book, Greider discusses
an earlier notion held by central banks that keeping the decision, and the reason to take such decision, in
secret is a better option to the central banks to perform their tasks in conducting monetary policy.
4
See L. E. Svensson, “Monetary policy and real stabilization,” National Bureau of Economic Research,
No. w9486, 2003.
5
See F. S. Mishkin & A. S. Posen, “Inflation targeting: lessons from four countries,” National Bureau of
Economic Research, No. w6126, 1998.
6
See Commission of the European Commission, “Public access to documents held by institutions of the
EC: A review,” Green paper, 2007, COM (2007), 185 final.
7
Hancher and Larouche in P. Craig and G. De Burca. The Evolution of EU Law (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2011).
8
See C. J. Hanretty, C. J. et al. “Independence, accountability and perceived quality of regulators,” CERRE
Study, Centre of Regulation in Europe, Brussels, 6 March 2012.
9
Mishkin, “Can central bank transparency go too far?”
10
Goodhart. Monetary transmission
11
S. Hamalainen, “The ECB's monetary policy – accountability, transparency and communication,” A
speech delivered to the Conference on Old Age, New Economy and Central Banking, organised by CEPR/ESI
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central bank to be selective in communicating its policy.
This paper aims at investigating the implementation of the notion of transparency
by the Indonesian central bank: how such transparency has been implemented and
what impact it brings to the central bank’s performance in conducting monetary
policy. In so doing, this paper mostly employs legal analysis with economic reviews
in particular cases. First of all, an initial analysis is carried out to scrutinize the laws
and regulations regarding transparency in Indonesia. It is a normative analysis of the
Indonesian regulatory frameworks for transparency, central bank transparency, and
central bank’s objectives and tasks in the economy. Secondly, a literature analysis of
the central bank transparency and an international practice analysis with a focus on
the Federal Reserve System (the Fed), the European Central Bank (ECB), the Bank of
England (BoE), and the Bank of Japan (BoJ) are performed to set a benchmark. Finally,
a performance analysis is conducted to seek the implementation of the notion of
transparency by the central Bank of Indonesia, and the extent to which transparency
has an effect on the central bank’s performance.

II. THE NOTION OF TRANSPARENCY UNDER INDONESIAN LAW
A. The Regulatory Framework for Transparency in Indonesia

As in many other jurisdictions such as the European Union (EU) where transparency
is anchored in the constitutions of the Union,12 transparency in Indonesia also has
an origin in the constitution, namely the second amendment to the Undang-Undang
Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia 1945 (UUD 45).13 However, unlike in the EU where
transparency has, at least, four elements encompassing openness, legal clarity, right
to access to documents, and duty to give a reason,14 transparency stated under
the Constitution of Indonesia is limited to the right to obtain information.15 Under
Article 28F of the UUD 45, the Indonesian constitution guarantees the right of any
individual to obtain information in order for him or her to develop him/herself and
his/her surroundings.16 Such right includes to seek, process, possess and convey any
information using any available mediums.
Details of the regulatory framework regarding the right to obtain information have
been further regulated in Indonesian Law Number 14 of 2008 on Public Information
Transparency. The said law adopts the principles that public information shall be,
by nature, open and accessible to the public, and exemptions shall be made only in
and Suomen Pankki, 14 September 2001, Helsinki.
12
Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Lisbon, 13
December 2007.
13
The second amendment was adopted in 2000 where six articles were amended and 19 new articles
were introduced. Ten out of 19 new articles are on human rights including the rights to obtain information.
For a brief discussion on the amendment of Indonesian constitution see for instance: Totok Sarsito, “The
Indonesian Constitution 1945: Why was it amended?,” https://core.ac.uk/download/files/478/12345691.
pdf, last accessed on 3 March 2016.
14
Some elements such as openness and rights to access to documents are even growing to become a
self-standing principle. See S. Prechal and M. E. De Leeuw, “Transparency: A General Principle of EU Law,”
in General Principles of EC Law in a Process of Development, eds. Ulf Bernitz, et. al. (The Netherlands: Kluwer
Law International, 2007).
15
See article 28F of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. An unofficial translation of UUD
45 is, for example, available at http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_protect/---protrav/--ilo_aids/documents/legaldocument/wcms_174556.pdf, last accessed on 3 March 2016.
16
The article 28F ibid states that “Every person shall have the right to communicate and to obtain information for the purpose of the development of him/her self and social environment, and shall have the right
to seek, obtain, possess, store, process and convey information by employing all available types of channels”.
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a strict and restricted manner.17 Furthermore, the law lays down the rules regarding
the coverage of information and public information, the types of information which
must be provided by public bodies,18 the manner in which such information is to be
obtained, and the type of information exempted. Under such rule, information means
“any description, statement, idea, and signs that contain a value, meaning and message
either as data, facts or their elucidation that may be seen, heard and read… electronically
or non-electronically”,19 while public information includes “any information produced,
stored, managed, sent and/or received by a government agency about rules and
governance of the state, and other information concerning public interest.20
Each government agency in Indonesia is obligated to provide public information
that can be accessed by individuals. Such information must, the law further explaines,
be published and made available periodically, promptly, and at any time.21 An
exemption is set forth in Article 17 of the Law, which includes information whose
disclosure could potentially obstruct or cause harm in crucial matters. It includes
hindering or damaging the due process of law, protection of intellectual property
rights and fair competition, state defense and security, Indonesia’s natural resource
assets, national economic resilience, international relations, and any authentic
personal certificate or personal secrecy. Furthermore, information that is not to be
disclosed pursuant to legislation is also exempted.22 Exemption provisions that relate
to the work of the central bank deal with information regarding economic conditions
whose disclosure could be harmful to national economic resilience. This includes
the original plan to purchase or sell national as well as foreign currencies or vital
assets of the country, the original plan to adjust the exchange or interest rates or the
operation of the Indonesian financial models, or issues regarding the printing process
of banknotes or minting of coins.23
B. Transparency and Democracy

According to freedomhouse.org, Indonesia was one of the electoral democracy
countries with a status of partly free for total freedom and partly free for both freedom
of the press and freedom on the net in 2015.24 Indonesia scored for total freedom at
65 out of 100, with political rights, civil liberties, and freedom scored at 2, 4, and
3 respectively (where 1 represents the freest while 7 means the least free). These
scores make Indonesia the biggest electoral democracy country in the world with
only a status of partly free, where other democracy ‘giants’ such as the USA, India, and
Brazil gain each the status of free (see Figure 1 for details).

Indonesia used to have a status of free from 2006 to 2013, the highest status of
freedom awarded. However, since 2014 the status has degraded from entirely free
to partly free, mainly because of the reduction of civil liberties which rate from 3 to
4 (remember that 1 represents the most unfettered while 7 means the least free).
The decline of civil liberties, the freedomhouse.org assessment further explains,
was mainly caused by the adoption of regulations dealing with nongovernmental
17
See Indonesia, Undang-undang tentang Keterbukaan Informasi Publik (Law on the Public Information Openness]. Undang-undang Nomor 14 tahun 2008, LN No. 61 tahun 2008, TLN No. 4846 (Law No. 14 of
2008, SG No. 61 of 2008). Hereinafter referred as Public Information Openness Law
18
Including state-owned enterprises.
19
See Public Information Openness Law, Art. 1 para. 1
20
See Ibid., Art. 1 para. 2
21
See Ibid., Articles 9, 10, and 11 respectively.
22
See Ibid. Article 7
23
See Ibid. paragraph e of Article 17
24
See Freedom House, “Freedom in the World 2016,” https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedomworld/freedom-world-2016, accessed on March 2, 2016; See in particular a figure 1 below.
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organizations (NGOs), as such laws restricting the activities of NGOs, increasing the
supervision of NGOs, and requiring NGOs to support the state ideology.25
Figure 1.

The freedom status among the electoral democracy countries in the world

Source: Freedom House, Freedom in the World, 201626
25
See Freedom House, “Indonesia,” https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2014/indonesia,
last accessed on March 2, 2016.
26
Available at https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FH_FITW_Report_2016.pdf, last accessed

Volume 7 Number 2, May - August 2017 ~ INDONESIA Law Review

CENTRAL BANK TRANSPARENCY

~ 183 ~

Press democracy in Indonesia is also worth discussing. After the collapse of the
authoritarian regime in 1998, the press has been liberalized from the state-domination
regime. However, only a few realize that the media has fallen into an economic power
system ever since.27 The evidence of this could be found in three different facts: the
structure of the market, paradox in market growth, and the election coverage bias.
Firstly, the market structure of the Indonesian media shows that the ownership of
companies is rather centralized. Hence, the market is oligarchic. This condition
somewhat influences the freedom of the journalists as demonstrated by, for instance,
the fact that there were only 31 worker unions out of thousands of media outlets in
2012.28 The second proof is shown by the media market growth which can be seen as
a sort of paradox. For instance, despite the fact that the market significantly grows as
demonstrated by the tenth time increase in advertisement purchases, the quality of
media contents is rather low, as it has been steered by rating. Advertisement purchases
grew from US$6 million to US$60 million from 1999 to 2010, and it became US$90
million by 2012, but the media do not care about the quality as they only focus on the
profits. Finally, some media such as TV stations were strongly biased in reporting the
news during the presidential election. They were segregated under political interests
just because they are owned by a person supporting a particular candidate. Hence,
the media was no longer independent.29 For these reasons, it is not surprising that the
world press freedom index scored Indonesia subtle in 2015, which was at 40.75 and
ranked Indonesia at 138 out of 180 countries assessed.30
One of the other crucial democratic elements, economic democracy, has also made
little improvement. Heritage.org indicates that the 2016 economic freedom index of
Indonesia scores at 59.4, increasing by 1.3 points compared to that in 2015. This score
is below the world’s average which is at 60.7 and only slightly above the regional
average (Asia-Pacific) which is at 59. It means that economic freedom in Indonesia
is mostly unfree. The assessment uses ten economic freedom indicators from open
markets (trade, financial, and investment freedoms), regulator efficiencies (business,
labor, and monetary freedoms), government size (government spending and fiscal
freedom), to the rule of law (from property rights to protection against corruption).
The government spending scores the highest (at 89), whereas property rights and
protection against corruption are the lowest (at 30 and 34 respectively).31
C. Transparency and Human Rights

Since February 23, 2006, Indonesia has become party to the International Covenant
on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, and since the Indonesian Constitution was
amended for the second time in 2003, several positive rights have been adopted.
Among other rights adopted are: the right to live, to establish a family, to prosper
and improve, and to communicate and obtain information.32 Furthermore, since 1999,
Indonesia has enacted the Human Rights Law, a law exclusively dealing with human

on February 22, 2016.
27
See for instance Kristiawan. “The dilemma of liberal media.” The Jakarta Post, 5 June 2014, available at: http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/06/05/the-dilemma-liberal-media.html#sthash.
Hk0zXtZ0.dpuf, last accessed on March 2, 2016. In this news article, the author mentioned that, theoretically, the press freedom often falls to an economic-power regime after liberalized itself from a dictatorial
regime.
28
Ibid.
29
In the sense that they tend to air the news in favor of their owner who is in support of a particular
presidential candidate. This phenomenon was widespread across the nation during the election.
30
See https://index.rsf.org/#!/, last accessed on March 2, 2016.
31
See Indonesia, Economic Freedom Score, available at http://www.heritage.org/index/pdf/2016/
countries/indonesia.pdf, last accessed on March 2, 2016.
32
Juwana, H. “Human Rights in Indonesia.” Indonesian J. Int'l L., 2006: 4, 27.
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rights in Indonesia.33 This law contains 106 articles concerning various fundamental
rights, including some positive rights mentioned above. The detailed provisions
regarding some fundamental human rights regulated under such law include the right
to live and not to be abducted or killed, the right to establish a family and bear children,
and the right to self-development. The right to obtain information is ruled under the
right to self-development.34 Article 14 of such law35 regulates that every single person
has the right to communicate and obtain information to develop him/herself and his/
her environment.36 In order to exercise such right, he or she could search for, acquire,
possess, process or transfer information using any available mediums.37 The wording
of this particular provision is somewhat similar to that in the Constitution.38
Under the law, it is the obligation of the government to respect, protect, enforce, and
develop human rights in Indonesia.39 Such obligation also includes defining measures
for the implementation of human rights in the area of law, politics, economy, social
affairs, culture, and defense.40 Human rights in Indonesia, at least in theory, can only
be restricted by a law that provides for rules concerning rights and freedom of others,
morality, public order, and the nation’s interests.41 The government, politicians or
other parties are not justified to reduce, restrict, obstruct, or eliminate human rights
regulated by Law Number 39 of 1999.42

Although Law Number 14 of 2008 on Public Information Transparency sets forth
adequate rules for the right to freedom of information, the implementation is rather
flawed.43 The right to obtain information is often restricted by other laws in the
course of application. For example, under the Indonesian Criminal Code, the release
of military and related sensitive information is threatened by criminal sanctions.44
Under Article 112 of such code, it is ruled that any person deliberately “releasing
any documents or information which, in the interest of the state, should be kept secret
or informing or rendering to foreign countries can be jailed for a maximum of seven
years”.45 Also, anyone who leaks secret state documents (this term has a broad scope
including maps, drawings, plans, or anything relating to security and state defense
policies) can be penalized with a maximum of four-year jail term.46 As there are
no clear-cut definitions and coverage of state secrets, these rules are wide open to
misinterpretation or even abuse by law enforcers. Furthermore, the Law concerning
State Intelligence that was enacted in 2011 can also substantially limit the application
of the transparency law.47 For instance, similar to that of the Criminal Code, Articles
26 and 44 of the State Intelligence Law restrict any legal persons or bodies from
33
See Indonesia. Undang-Undang tentang Hak Asasi Manusia (Law regarding Human Rights). UU No. 39
Tahun 1999, LN No. 165 Tahun 1999 (Law Number 39 of 1999, SG No. 165 of 1999).
34
See article 11-16 of Law Number 39 of 1999.
35
Law Number 39 of 1999, available in Bahasa Indonesia at http://sulut.kemenag.go.id/file/dokumen/UURIno39tahun199.pdf, last accessed on February 20, 2016.
36
Article 14 paragraph 1
37
See Article 14 paragraph 2.
38
See Article 28F of UUD 45, the second amendment.
39
See Article 71 of Law Number 39 of 1999.
40
See Article 72 of Law Number 39 of 1999.
41
See Article 73 of Law Number 39 of 1999.
42
See Article 74 of Law Numbero 39 of 1999.
43
See for instance the 2015 assessment of Indonesia by freedomhouse.org, available at https://
freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2015/indonesia, last accessed on February 22, 2016
44
See Article 112 to 116 of the Indonesian Criminal Code.
45
Article 112 of the Criminal Code.
46
Article 113(1) of the Criminal Code.
47
Law Number 17 of 2011.
Indonesia, Undang-undang tentang Intelijen Negara (Law on the State Intelligence), Undang-undang
nomor 17 tahun 2011, LN No. 105 tahun 2011, TLN No. 5249 (Law No 17 of 2011, SG No. 105 of 2011).
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communicating or revealing state secrets. Such person can be punished up to 10 years
in prison and fines of approximately 40,000 USD. The broad coverage of state secrets
that could potentially restrict the freedom of expression in Indonesia was also one
of the reasons for a judicial review of the State Intelligence Law brought by some
NGOs and individuals,48 but the application was rejected by the Constitutional Court
of Indonesia.49 The court believes that such regulation is needed to keep the society in
order, and that such rule does not contradict the Constitution. In addition, the use of
the 2008 Electronic Transaction and Information (ITE) Law and Law on Archives also
raises concerns about freedom of expression.50 The former raises concerns regarding
liberty on the Internet while the latter rules set forth that anyone who illegally
possesses state archives is to be penalized with a maximum of five-year jail term.51
D. Transparency and Good Governance

Transparency is a crucial element of good governance, besides other factors such
as accountability, responsibility, independence, and fairness.52 The Governance Index
introduced by the World Bank53 demonstrates that Indonesia has, in general, a weak
to medium governance index, although the trend has shown a steady improvement
since 2004 (see Figure 2 for details). The index employs measures that are somewhat
closely related to transparency, such as voice and accountability, political stability,
government effectiveness, the rule of law, regulatory quality, and control of corruption.
Among the highest scores are voice and accountability and government effectiveness.
This indicator is in line with the effort from the governments, both central and local,
to improve the implementation of good governance continuously, as evident from
the achievement of some local governments by placing the licensing processes under
one roof and by enabling the completion of the process in a single working day. With
regard to the corruption perception index, Indonesia was scored at 36 out of 100 by
the Transparency International in January this year. This score is subtle, and it ranks
at 88 out of 167 countries measured.54 Among the public agencies with the lower
scores in corruption perception are public enforcement offices such as the police
department and judicial agency.
48
For a brief description of the case, see for instance Public Amicus Brief by “Article 19: Global Campaign for Free Expression” (http://www.article19.org), Judicial Review of Law Number 17 of 2011 on State
Intelligence, Case Number 07/PUU-X/2012, available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/4fa778732.html,
last accessed on March 6, 2016.
49
For the decision of Case Number 07/PUU-X/2012 adopted by the Indonesian Constitutional Court,
see https://www.kontras.org/data/Putusan%20sidang%20JR%20UU%20intelijen.pdf, last accessed on
March 6, 2016.
50
See freedomhouse.org assessment on Indonesia, available at https://freedomhouse.org/report/
freedom-press/2015/indonesia, last accessed on February 22, 2016.
51
Article 81 of Law Number 43 of 2009. For a brief discussion on this issue, see Himahanto Juwana,
“Human Rights in Indonesia,” Indonesian Journal of International Law 4 (2006), p. 27. However, this article
discusses such issue based on the previous law on archive, Law Number 7 of 1971, which has already been
revoked by the 2009 Law.
52
See for Graham, Amos, & Plumptre. “Principles for good governance in the 21st century.” Policy brief,
15, 2003, pp. 1-6.
53
World Bank, “Worldwide Governance Indicators,” available at http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#reports, last accessed on February 22, 2016.
54
See Transparency International, “Corruption Perceptions Index 2015,” Available at http://www.
transparency.org/cpi2015, last accessed on February 22, 2016. See also https://www.transparency.org/
country/#IDN, last accessed on March 3, 2016.
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Figure 2. Governance index of Indonesia, 2004-2014.
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Source: The World Bank55

III. THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR CENTRAL BANK TRANSPARENCY IN INDONESIA
In general, Indonesian laws applicable to transparency employed by the central
bank consist of two primary legislations. Firstly, Law Number 23 of 1999 concerning
Bank Indonesia as amended twice, in 2004 and 2009 respectively, and secondly, Law
Number 14 of 2008 regarding Public Information Transparency which has been
described previously.
A. Law Number 23 of 1999 concerning Bank Indonesia

Since the enactment of Law Number 23 of 1999 concerning Bank Indonesia, the
central bank of Indonesia has gained independence from the government, in particular
in conducting monetary policy. Such independence has been deemed necessary for the
central bank to assure the accomplishment of the single objective of maintaining the
stability of Rupiah.56 Specifically, the independence of the central bank is ruled under
Article 4 of the Law which states that Bank Indonesia is an independent public body,
free from the government’s or any other party’s intervention, except for undertakings
expressly described in such law.57
In theory, the independence of the central bank is manifested in at least two
forms. Firstly, being independent to define the objective (goal independence) and the
strategy to achieve such objective (instrument independence),58 and secondly, being
55
Available at http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#reports, last accessed on 22
February 2016.
56
See consideration of Law Number 23 of 1999.
57
The wording of Article 4 of Law Number 23 of 1999 was amended in 2004 for more clarity without
changing the substance of the provision. See Law of the Republic of Indonesia Number 3 of 2004 concerning Amendment to Law of the Republic of Indonesia Number 23 of 1999 concerning Bank Indonesia,
available at http://www.bi.go.id/en/tentang-bi/uu-bi/Documents/UU32004_Engl.pdf, last accessed on
February 19, 2016.
58
See Debelle & Fischer. How Independence Should a Central Bank Be. Facing Monetary Policymakers,
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independent in terms of budgetary and financing (budget independence).59 In this case,
Bank Indonesia has the goal and budget independences, but not goal independence.
In measuring the objective of maintaining the stability of Rupiah, Bank Indonesia is
obligated to cooperate with the government. Such cooperation appears in the form of
the announcement of the inflation target by the government at the beginning of each
year, after such target has been consulted with Bank Indonesia. The central bank then
focuses its efforts and work to achieve such Coming along with the independence,
the obligation for transparency and accountability has also been strengthened. After
gaining independence in 1999, Bank Indonesia is expected to be more transparent
and has been implementing the principles of good governance ever since.60 As defined
by such law, the transparency obligations consist of the central bank’s responsibility
to submit annual and quarterly reports to the parliament and government.61 Such
reports mainly contain the evaluation of the central bank’s achievement during the
preceding year and the plan or strategy for the coming year. Also, the central bank must
publish the summary of such reports in the State Gazette and inform the public abut
the substance of such reports through the mass media at the beginning of each year.
The original area covered by the reports used to be economic growth and indicators,
monetary policy, banking supervision, and payment systems development. However,
since the task of banking supervisions has been shifted out to the financial service
authority (Otoritas Jasa Keuangan/OJK) since the end of 2013,62 the 2014 and 2015
reports contain only economic, monetary, payment systems and financial stability
performance.
For details of information that must be provided by Bank Indonesia in compliance
with the transparency obligation under Law Number 23 of 1999, see Table 1
paragraph 1.

1994, p. 195.
59
See for instance Fischer, S. “Central-bank independence revisited,” The American Economic Review
85, no. 2 (1995), pp. 201-206.
60
This general rule applies to all central banks. See for instance a discussion by C. Crowe & E. E. Meade,
“Central bank independence and transparency: Evolution and effectiveness,” European Journal of Political
Economy 24, no. 4 (2008), pp. 763-777.
61
Elucidation on Law No. 23 of 1999, available in Bahasa Indonesia at http://www.bi.go.id/en/tentang-bi/uu-bi/Documents/penjelasan.pdf, last accessed on February 19, 2016.
62
The mandate to shift the banking supervision task to OJK was originally regulated under Article 34
of Law Number 23 of 1999 concerning Bank Indonesia which was then regulated further by Law Number
21 of 2011 concerning OJK.
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Table 1. Types of information provided by Bank Indonesia in concordance with laws

Laws
Under Law
concerning
Bank
Indonesia

Under Law
concerning
Public
Information
Transparency

Types of Information
1. Annual reports to the House of Representatives and the
Government at the beginning of the fiscal year, containing:
- performance during the preceding year;
- policy planning, target, and measures for performance
for the coming year.
2. Quarterly reports on the performance of duties to the
House of Representatives and the Government.
3. Both annual and quarterly reports are to be disclosed in
the mass media.
4. A summary of both reports is to be published in the State
Gazette,
5. Verbal and/or written explanation to the House of
Representatives, if required.
6. Information to the public at the beginning of the year,
which contains the following:
- evaluation of monetary policy in the preceding year;
- plan and inflation target for the coming year.
1. Periodic information.
2. Prompt information.
3. Information that is available at all time.

Reference
Art. 58 (1)
Art. 58 (2)
Art. 58 (5)
Art. 58 (5)
Art. 58 (4)
Art. 58 (6)
Art. 9
Art. 10
Art. 11

B. Law Number 14 of 2008 concerning Public Information Transparency
By definition, the Indonesian central bank falls outside the scope of public
institutions defined in the Public Information Transparency Law. Such law adopts
a principle that it only applicable to the state organs which are partially or fully
funded by the government’s budget, whereas the central bank has an independent
budgetary system.63 De jure, de facto, and historically since gaining independence
in 1999, the central bank of Indonesia is no longer financed by the government’s
budget. De jure, the central bank law64 has mandated that the central bank is a legal
entity that has the power to possess, fund, and manage its own financial system.65 De
facto, the central bank of Indonesia is currently managing the state foreign exchange
reserve that accounted for nearly 106 billion USD by the end of December 2015.66 The
central bank finances its operations from the turn-over of these funds. Historically
since attaining independence in 1999, Bank Indonesia has managed its own budget.
It needs, however, approval of the House of Representatives regarding operational
funds at the beginning of each year.67
Although falling outside the definition of public institutions defined in Law Number
14 of 2008, Bank Indonesia has designated itself to comply with such law. As a part

See Article 1 paragraph 3 of Law Number 14 of 2008.
This central bank law has been amended twice, namely in 2004 and 2009 respectively.
65
See Article 4 paragraph 3 of Law Number 23 of 1999 which states that the central bank is a legal
entity. Hence, it has the ability to manage its own budgetary system.
66
See the International Monetary Fund data, available at https://www.imf.org/external/np/sta/ir/
IRProcessWeb/data/idn/eng/curidn.htm, last accessed of February 14, 2016. However, the recent update
of this data shows that the amount decreased to approximately 102 billion USD by the end of January 2016.
See for instance http://www.bloomberg.com/quote/IDGFA:IND, last accessed on February 14, 2016.
67
See Article 58 of Law Number 23 of 1999.
63
64
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of legal counsels within the Bank, the author himself often experienced that Bank
Indonesia has often chosen to comply with the positive laws, although such laws have
expressed, directly or indirectly, not to cater for an institution similar to the central
bank that is not funded by the government. Another example of this circumstance is
Presidential Regulation Number 54 of 2010 concerning Public Procurement which
explicitly states to cover only procurement conducted by government funded bodies.
The central bank’s designation to comply with Law Number 14 of 2008 could be
justified under the doctrine of vrijwillige onderwerping68 applicable in private law. 69
It adopts the principle that a legal entity in Indonesia may designate itself to comply
with private and business laws even though such laws do not actually put it under
regulation.70 Upon such designation, the central bank is expected to obey the rules
defined in the law concerned, including taking precautionary steps to avoid sanctions.
As mentioned previously, the transparency obligation imposed by such law is mainly
to provide public information periodically, promptly, and at any time (See Table 1
paragraph 2 for the details of such obligation).

IV. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CENTRAL BANK TRANSPARENCY IN INDONESIA
A. Public Information Provided by Bank Indonesia (Active)

By complying with the Laws concerning Bank Indonesia and Public Information
Transparency, the central bank of Indonesia implements the transparency principles
by providing static as well as dynamic information. The former appears in the form
of various information on the objectives and functions of the central bank71 as well
as public documents accessible to individuals by request, whereas the latter includes
annual and quarterly reports, projection and announcement of interest rate, working
papers, and various interviews.

In applying the transparency obligation under the central bank law, Bank
Indonesia is continuously providing information on a regular basis to three
different stakeholders: the public, the government, and the parliament (House of
Representatives). Such information predominantly appears in the form of annual and
quarterly reports, whereas other types such as working or evaluation papers are a
minority. Annual reports consist of economic reports,72 annually financial statements,
and annual reports73 from 2003-2014.74 As for information to the public in general,
the official website of the central bank provides various updates including the latest
information on monetary policy, financial stability, and payment systems,75 press
68
Regeling nopens de Vrijwillige Onderwerping aan het Europeesch Privaatrecht, S. 1917-12, 528, October 1, 1917; Self designation principles that are applicable to private law.
69
Using this doctrine applicable to private law to justify the central bank’s act in designating itself under the public law actually needs further assessment. However, as there is a lack of doctrines or principles
under Indonesian Public Law that can justify such designation, the application of the vrijwillige onderwerping doctrine is arguably legitimate.
70
See Article 30 of Regeling nopens de Vrijwillige Onderwerping aan het Europeesch Privaatrecht, S.
1917-12, 528, October 1, 1917.
71
Available on the official homepage of Bank Indonesia: http://www.bi.go.id/en/Default.aspx, last accessed on February 24, 2016.
72
Laporan Perekonomian Indonesia (LPI), [Report on Indonesia’s Economy] available at http://www.
bi.go.id/en/publikasi/laporan-tahunan/perekonomian/Default.aspx, last accessed on February 24, 2016.
73
Laporan Keuangan Tahunan Bank Indonesia (LKTBI) [Bank Indonesia Annual Financial Report] and
Laporan Tahunan Bank Indonesia [Bank Indonesia Annual Report] respectively, available at http://www.
bi.go.id/en/publikasi/laporan-tahunan/bi/Default.aspx, last accessed on February 24 , 2016.
74
This is based on the assessment of the reports available on the official homepage of Bank Indonesia
up to February 24, 2016.
75
Available at http://www.bi.go.id/en/ruang-media/info-terbaru/Default.aspx, last accessed on Feb-
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releases,76 and governor speeches.77

As for the information provided pursuant to the Law concerning Public
Information Transparency, the central bank of Indonesia has made available a total
of approximately 190 types of information on its official homepage. As mentioned
previously, such information in compliance with the Public Information Transparency
Law encompasses periodic, prompt, and at any time information, whereby the 190
kinds of information comprise of 157 types of periodic information, none of it is
prompt information, and 33 types of information that are available at provided at
any time. However, after carefully scrutinized, all information contained in the group
of ‘available at any time’ information has actually been included in the periodic
information. So has prompt information such as the announcement of the central bank
rate that is available right after the Board adopts a decision in the monthly meeting.
Hence, the actual public information provided by the central bank of Indonesia
consists of 157 types. It encompasses profile of the central bank, monetary policy
related, financial stability related, regulations, payment systems related, publications,
and statistics (see Figure 3 for the contents of information available on the central
bank’s website and Appendix 1 for the details thereof).
Figure 3 Information provided by Bank Indonesia pursuant to Law concerning Public Information
Transparency

Source: Bank Indonesia78

B. Access to Documents/The Right to Obtain Information (Passive)
In implementing the Public Information Transparency Law, Bank Indonesia does
not only make periodic, prompt, and at any time information available, but also
provides services which enable the public to enquire about any public information
held by Bank Indonesia. Such requests can be made through various channels:
ruary 25, 2016.
76
Available at http://www.bi.go.id/en/ruang-media/siaran-pers/Default.aspx, last accessed on February 25, 2016.
77
Including the deputy governor speeches, available at http://www.bi.go.id/en/ruang-media/pidatodewan-gubernur/Default.aspx, last accessed on February 25, 2016.
78
Summarized from data available at http://www.bi.go.id/en/Default.aspx, last accessed on February
24, 2016. See Appendix 1 for details of the report.
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sending a letter or email or facsimile, visiting the counters provided by Bank
Indonesia to address the requests,79 or contacting the call center.80 The Head Group
of Communication Department is acting as the official (Pejabat Pengelola Informasi
dan Dokumentasi/PPID) responsible for addressing all requests to the central bank.
According to Bank Indonesia self-assessment report on public information services,81
Bank Indonesia received 94,885 inquiries in 2015. It increased by 170% from 2014,
which was at 35,134 requests. The average time to settle the inquiries, as the selfassessment report further described, was only one working day, with 96 per cent of
stakeholders submitting the requests satisfied with the responses. The most asked
areas include Bank Indonesia regulations, credit scoring and records, Bank Indonesia
real time gross settlement (BI-RTGS) and payment versus payment (PvP), Bank
Indonesia clearing systems (Sistem Kliring Nasional Bank Indonesia/SKNBI), and
credit card issues (see Figure 4 for details).
Figure 4 Top issues inquired by the public to Bank Indonesia

Central banking
Credit cards,
issues, 2,689
2,556
Currencyrelated, 3,450

BI regulations,
18,576
Clearing Systems,
9,774

BI-RTGS and PVP,
10,128

Credit records,
14,525

Source: Bank Indonesia82

C. Audit by the Supreme Audit Board and the Establishment of Bank Indonesia
Supervisory Body
To strengthen the implementation of transparency principle, Bank Indonesia
is also annually audited by the Supreme Audit Board. Such supreme audit mostly
conducts the assessment based on the annual financial report submitted by Bank

79
So-called “Gerai Info”. This specific counters even have bi-monthly newsletter. See http://www.bi.go.
id/id/publikasi/gerai-info/Default.aspx, last accessed on February 25, 2016.
80
Contact Center Bank Indonesia, BICARA, provides specific lines to be contacted by phone at 131 (local fare) and 1500131 (outside Indonesia), or by fax at (+62)21 386 – 4884, or email at bicara@bi.go.id. See
http://www.bi.go.id/en/Kontak-BI.aspx, last accessed on February 25, 2016.
81
Available at http://www.bi.go.id/id/lip/laporan/Default.aspxa, last accessed on February 10, 2016.
82
Laporan Layanan Informasi Publik, [Public Information Service Report] available at http://www.
bi.go.id/id/lip/laporan/Default.aspxa, last accessed on February 10, 2016
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Indonesia by the end of the year.83 However, such supreme audit may also carry out an
audit investigation upon84 the request of the parliament where it deems necessary.85
Recently, when the Rupiah rate was volatile at the beginning of 2016, there was a
public debate as to whether the Supreme Audit Board ought to audit the central
bank performance in conducting monetary policy.86 However, as mandated by the
central bank law, the Supreme Audit Board has no power to review the central bank
performance in conducting monetary policy, except when requested by the House of
Representatives to conduct an audit investigation. 87

A supervisory body88 was also established in 2004 to strengthen the transparency,
accountability, and credibility of the central bank.89 This organ has the task to assist
the parliament in performing the function of supervising the central bank.90 In
order to reflect the principle of transparency, the supervisory body must submit the
performance report to the parliament quarterly or at any time as required by the
House of Representatives. However, the Supervisory Body is not allowed, by law, to
participate in the decision-making processes of the central bank nor to conduct an
assessment regarding the performance of the Board of Governors in particular in
conducting monetary policy.91
D. Transparency Index

Eijffinger & Geraats (E&G, 2002) have developed a transparency index for
central banks. It primarily consists of five areas of transparency: political, economic,
procedural, policy, and operational transparencies.92 Dincer & Eichengreen (D&E,
2007, 2010) use the index to determine the transparency of central banks around
the world, including the central bank of Indonesia.93 In defining the transparency
employed by each central bank, they break down each of the five components of
transparencies into three questions and score each answer with 0, 0.5, or 1. Hence,
in total, there are 15 questions of assessments with total points of 15 if all items
are satisfied. The 15 questions are well-defined and cover all possible elements of
transparency, ranging from the clarity of the formal objectives to the transparency of
policy models and central bank forecasts, to the publication of minutes of the board
meetings (see Table 2 for details).
83
By no later than 30 days after the fiscal year ends. See Article 61 of Law Number 23 of 1999 concerning Bank Indonesia.
84
A special examination on a certain issue(s).
85
See Article 59 of Law Number 23 of 1999 concerning Bank Indonesia, available at http://www.bi.go.
id/en/tentang-bi/uu-bi/Documents/act2399.pdf, last accessed on February 19, 2016.
86
See for instance http://katadata.co.id/berita/2016/01/12/redam-gejolak-bi-harap-bpk-tak-gelaraudit-investigasi#sthash.sWEBMkhN.dpbs, last accessed on March 10, 2016.
87
“BPK Awaiting House Permission to Audit BI over Rupiah Depreciation Allegations”, available at
http://jakartaglobe.beritasatu.com/economy/bpk-awaiting-house-permission-audit-bi-rupiah-depreciation-allegations/, last accessed on March 10 , 2016.
88
Badan Supervisi Bank Indonesia (BSBI); its official homepage is available at http://www.bsbi.go.id/,
last accessed on February 22, 2016.
89
Together with accountability, independence, transparency, and credibility.
90
See article 58A Law Number 3 of 2004.
91
Elucidation on Law of the Republic of Indonesia Number 3 of 2004 concerning Amendment to Law
of the Republic of Indonesia Number 23 of 1999 concerning Bank Indonesia, available at http://www.bi.go.
id/en/tentang-bi/uu-bi/Documents/UU32004_penj_Engl.pdf, last accessed on February 19, 2016.
92
See Eijffinger & Geraats, “How transparent are Central Banks?” Centre for Economic Policy Research,
London, Discussion Paper, No. 3188, 2002.
93
See N. N. Dincer & B. Eichengreen, Central bank transparency: where, why, and with what effects?
(No. w13003). National Bureau of Economic Research, 2007 and N. Dincer & B. Eichengreen “Central bank
transparency: causes, consequences and updates,” Theoretical Inquiries in Law 11, no. 1 (2010), 75-123.
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Table 2 Transparency components, E&G index, D&E explan

Components

1. Political Transparency
(a) Formal objectives

(b) Quantitative targets
(c) Institutional
arrangements

2. Economic Transparency
(a) Economic data
(b) Policy models

(c) Central Bank forecasts
3. Procedural Transparency
(a) Explicit strategy
(b) Minutes

(c) Voting records
4. Policy Transparency

(a) Prompt announcement

Score

0

0.5

No formal objective Multiple without
priority
No
-

One or multiple with
explicit priority
Yes

Quarterly time
series for up to two
of five variables
No

Quarterly time series
for all five variables

No

No

No.

No, or yes but after
more than eight
weeks
No, or yes but after
more than eight
weeks

Without explicit
independence or
contract

Quarterly time
series for three of
five variables
-

With explicit
independence or
contract

Yes

Less than quarterly Quarterly for the
medium term (one or
two years ahead).
--

Yes

Non-attributed

Yes

--

Yes, on the day of
implementation

--

(b) Policy explanation

No or yes but only
after the day of
implementation
No

(c) Policy inclination

No

Yes but only
superficially or
when a change is
made
--

(b) Transmission
disturbances
(c) Evaluation policy
outcomes

No or not very
often
No or not very
often
No or not very
often

Yes but without
explanation
Yes but only shortterm forecasts
Yes but only
superficially

5. Operational
Transparency
(a) Control errors

1

Yes

Yes, always
Yes
Yes

Yes including past
forecast errors
Yes including the
contribution to the
objective

Source: Eijffinger & Geraats (2002)94 and Dincer & Eichengreen95

94
95

See Eijffinger & Geraats, above n. 85.
See Dincer & Eichengreen, above n. 86.
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The results are provided in Figure 5 which consistsof transparency indices
of the central banks in the Southeast Asia region. As shown in the said figure, the
transparency employed by the Indonesian central bank indicates many improvements.
In 1998, Bank Indonesia transparency only scored at 3, which was one of the lowest in
the region, but it increased to 8 in 2004 and 8.5 in 2006, ranking among the best in the
region. It passed over Malaysia (at 5.5), Singapore (at 6.5), and Thailand (at 8), and
above the average of central bank transparency in Southeast Asia (at 7.7). However, it
is still below the Banko Sentral ng Pilipinas that reached 10.
Figure 5 Transparency Indices of Bank Indonesia Compared to Other Central Banks in the Region

Source: Dincer & Eichengreen (2010)96

V. CENTRAL BANK TRANSPARENCY IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS
Among hundreds of central banks across the world,97 there are some which are
considered as the most transparent central banks. These include the Central Bank of
New Zealand, the Bank of Canada, the Bank of England (BoE), the European Central
Bank (ECB), the Federal Reserve System of USA (the Fed), and the Bank of Japan (BoJ).
Following is an outline of the transparency policies of the four top central banks,
namely: the Fed, ECB, BoE, and BoJ, with the transparency index of each of these
central banks being provided in Figure 6.

See Dincer & Eichengreen, above n. 86.
List provided by the Bank for International Settlement (BIS) shows that, to date, there are 191 countries that have a central bank or a monetary authority. See https://www.bis.org/cbanks.htm, last accessed
on March 5, 2016.
96
97
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Figure 6 Transparency Indices of the Fed, ECB, BoE, and BoJ
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Source: Dincer & Eichengreen (2010)98

A. The Fed
In 2006, E&G index scored the Fed at 10 for transparency. The strongest points
earned by the Fed are policy transparency (100%) and economic transparency
(85%) while the lowest are political and operational transparencies. Hence, the Fed is
excellent with regards to soliciting its policy to public including making explanations
and inclinations about its policy, and providing economic data, models, and forecasts.
However, it is still lacking in defining its formal objectives, quantifying its targets
to achieve such goals and cooperation with the U.S. government and parliament to
achieve its objectives and strategy. Observing that the Fed’s transparency score was
quite steady for an extended period (at least from 1999 to 2006, see Figure 6), it
could be assumed that the problem might be structural. For instance concerning
political transparency, it is not an easy job to define or change the central bank’s
formal objective, quantify the targets or change the institutional arrangements as
they would involve external parties such as the government and parliament.
B. The ECB

Under EU law, transparency has not yet become a general principle, as it fails
to incorporate a minimum ascertainable legally binding context.99 However, some
of its elements, such as openness or the right to access to documents, are growing
to become self-standing principles.100 Transparency is anchored in the EU treaties
(primary law), and further regulated by secondary law. While secondary legislation
concerning transparency in the EU is still limited, case-law is growing, and it supports
the application of a general principle of transparency in the various types of cases,
even if and when secondary legislation is not technically applicable.101
The ECB transparency was scored at 11 by E&G central bank transparency index
(2006). In contrast to the Fed, the ECB earns full credits for political transparency

98
See J. de Haan, et. al. The European Central Bank: Credibility Transparency and Centralization (Boston:
MIT Press Books, 2005), p. 94.
99
See for instance Tridimas, The general principles of EU law
100
Prechal & De Leeuw, above n. 12.
101
Diamandourus, N. P. Contribution of the European Ombudsman to the public hearing on the Revision
of Regulation 1049/2001 on public access to documents, 2008.
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(100%). Hence, the formal objectives, quantitative targets, and institutional
arrangements of the ECB are very clear. It is easily understood as ECB is a union
central bank that was just formed in 1999 to accommodate the Single Euro Payment
Area (SEPA) in the EU. However, similar to the Fed, ECB is excellent in economic
transparency such as providing economic data and policy models and announcing its
forecasts. The weakest points earned by ECB are procedural and policy transparencies
that only gain up to 50%. They cover issues on defining the explicit strategy of
the central bank and publishing minutes and voting records. As mentioned in the
introduction of this paper, ECB refused to publish the minutes and voting records of
the board as it could complicate the decision-making process.102
C. BoE

BoE is one of the most transparent central banks in the world, scoring at 12.5 by
E&G index in 2006. It is high in almost every single aspect of transparencies but policy.
BoE scored at 100% for political and procedural transparencies and 85% for economic
and operational transparencies. The only weakest link was policy transparency
which scored at 50%. It covers prompt announcement, policy explanation and policy
inclination. Similar to the Fed, BoE has maintained this transparent condition for an
extended period of time, at least from the year of 2000 (see Figure 6). However, if the
Fed’s transparency issues deal with more political challenges (such as formal targets
and institutional arrangements), BoE has more ‘light’ issues as they deal with public
announcement and explanations.
D. BoJ
BoJ has been scored at 9.5 for transparency index since 2004 (see Figure 6). Prior
to that, it was composed at around 8 for quite a while (at least from 1998). This score
was even lower than that of Bank Indonesia as previously explained (at 8.5). Although
the lowest compared to the other three central banks discussed in this section, BoJ is
one of the most transparent central banks in Asia. It has substantial transparencies
on procedural issues (approximately at 70%) while the remaining components
(political, economic, policy, and operational transparencies) are at 50%. This fact is
significantly distinctive to other central banks, as procedural transparency deals with
the publication of strategy, minutes, and voting records. In general, most of the central
banks are reluctant to publish minutes and voting records as such publication can
complicate the decision-making process. However, this seems not to be a problem to
BoJ.

VI. THE IMPACT OF CENTRAL BANK TRANSPARENCY ON THE CENTRAL BANK’S PERFORMANCE
A. The Objectives of the Indonesian Central Bank
The central bank of Indonesia is one of many central banks that have a single
objective. Defined by law on the central bank, the single purpose is to achieve and
maintain the stability of Rupiah.103 To achieve such goal, Bank Indonesia defines, plans,
and implements the monetary policy that, as required by law, must be conducted on
a consistent, sustained, and transparent basis and by taking into consideration the

Hämäläinen, above n. 8.
See article 7 (1) of Law Number 3 of 2004 concerning Amendment to Law of the Republic of Indonesia Number 23 of 1999 concerning Bank Indonesia, available at http://www.bi.go.id/en/tentang-bi/uu-bi/
Documents/UU32004_Engl.pdf, last accessed on February 19, 2016.
102
103
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general policies in the economic area adopted by the government.104 Furthermore,
Bank Indonesia has initially three areas of functions to support the single objective
of achieving and maintaining the Rupiah stability, namely: monetary policy, banking
supervision, and payment systems. However, since the shifting of the banking
supervision tasks out from Bank Indonesia to OJK by the end of 2013,105 the duties now
mainly cover monetary policy, payment systems, and macro-prudential supervision.

The single objective of achieving and maintaining the Rupiah stability has two core
meanings: price and currency stability. The former has the meaning of the stability of
the price of goods and services while the latter is the stability of the local currency
against foreign currencies such as the USD or EUR. The former is also reflected in
the inflation while the latter is rather difficult to be measured, as it is represented
by the currency exchange of Rupiah against other currencies. 106 Like other central
banks, monetary policy conducted by Bank Indonesia aims at managing the pressure
on price from the demand side and not responding to inflation caused by temporary
shocks such as the increase in oil price. Hence, the central bank’s ability to manage the
inflation during the temporary shocks has been rather limited.107
B. The Central Bank’s Performance in Conducting Monetary Policy

Observing consumer price inflation in Indonesia during the last decade, one could
conclude that Indonesian inflation has sometimes been above the target upperceiling determined by Bank Indonesia and the government at the beginning of every
year. Consumer price inflation is measured by the Harmonized Index of Consumer
Prices (HICP). As indicated in Figure 7, year-on-year HICP inflation in Indonesia area
exceeded the targets for 50% of the months from February 2006 to January 2016.
However, these results are still better compared to, for instance, the ECB achievement
for the first decade after it was established, as discussed by Geraats (2008). In the said
paper, he reviews the ECB performance in achieving inflation targets and explains that
the ECB often exceeded the targets for 56% of the months in that ten year period.108
However, he is still of the opinion that, since inflation had been at an average level of
2.0% (whereas the average of real GDP growth had been at 2.2%), the economy of the
Euro area had performed remarkably well during its first decade.109 Geraats uses the
annual data of the Euro area provided by Eurostat from 1999 to 2007, covering 11
member states in 1999 and 13 in 2007.

104
See article 7 (2) of Law Number 3 of 2004 concerning Amendment to Law of the Republic of Indonesia Number 23 of 1999 concerning Bank Indonesia, available at http://www.bi.go.id/en/tentang-bi/uu-bi/
Documents/UU32004_Engl.pdf, last accessed on February 19, 2016.
105
According to article 55 paragraph 2 of Law Number 21 of 2011 on Financial Services Authority
(Otoritas Jasa Keuangan/OJK).
106
Elucidation to Act of the Republic of Indonesia Number 3 of 2004 concerning Amendment to Act of
the Republic of Indonesia Number 23 of 1999 concerning Bank Indonesia, available at http://www.bi.go.
id/en/tentang-bi/uu-bi/Documents/UU32004_penj_Engl.pdf, last accessed on February 19, 2016.
107
Ibid.
108
See Geraats, P. M. ECB credibility and transparency (No. 330). European Commission, DirectorateGeneral for Economic and Financial Affairs, 2008.
109
Ibid, p. 2.
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Figure 7 YoY HICP inflation in Indonesia and targets set by the government in the last decade

Source: Bank Indonesia110

C. The Central Bank’s Transparency and Accountability
Roll et. al. (1993) define accountability as “the act of listening to criticism and
responding to questions about the past and future behavior that may be put forward
by a democratically elected body”.111 There are several accountability indices for
the central bank developed and validated by researchers. Briault et al. (1996), for
instance, developed an accountability index for the central bank based on the following
criteria: 1) as to whether the parliament has the power to control the central bank;
2) as to whether the minutes of the board meetings regarding monetary policy are
published; 3) as to whether an addition report on monetary report or specifically
inflation is published; and 4) as to whether the government has the power to override
the central bank’s decision regarding monetary policy.112 Furthermore, De Haan and
Eijfinger (1999 and 2000) have also provided a quantitative index of the central
bank’s accountability, with a highlight on the interaction between the central bank
and political organs, in particular, the government and parliament.113
Following Briault et. al. (1996) and De Haan and Eijfinger (1999 and 2000), we
defined the accountability of the Indonesian central bank using the four components
previously mentioned. Such components are further broken down into 15 indicators.
Bank Indonesia is scored 14 for accountability index, and the comparison of this index
and those of other central banks (the Fed, ECB, BoE, and BoJ) is provided in Table 3.
110
Available at http://www.bi.go.id/id/moneter/inflasi/data/Default.aspx, last accessed on February
10, 2016.
111
See Roll et al. Independent and Accountable: A New Mandate for the Bank of England, CEPR, London,
1993 as in Bini-Smaghi, L., & Gros, D. Is the ECB sufficiently accountable and transparent? Centre for European Policy Studies, 2001: 2.
112
Briault, Haldane, & King. “Independence and Accountability.” Working Paper No. 49, Bank of England, 1996.
113
De Haan and Eijfinger (1999 and 2000).
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Table 3 Accountability Index of Centra

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

9
10
11
12
13
14
15

Items
Objective
Ultimate goal
Quantification
Strategy
Announcement of strategy
Announcement of
immediate target
Announcement of
indicators
Publications of data
Macro model
Data on targets
Inflation forecast
Communication strategy
Parliament hearings
Frequency of reports
Press conferences
Publication of press release
Statement of future moves
Publication of minutes
publication of votes
Total

The Fed

ECB

BoE

BoJ

BI

0

1

2

0

2

1
0
0
1
2
1
2

2
2
0
2
1
1
1
16

2
1
0
2
1
2
1

2
2
2
2
1
0
0
19

2
2
2
0
2
2
2

2
1
2
1
0
2
2
24

Source: Bini-Smaghi & Gros (2001)114

2
0
0
0
0
0
0

2
2
2
2
0
2
2
14

2
1
0
0
0
0
1

2
2
2
2
0
0
0
14

When the transparency and accountability indices of those five central banks
are compared, the data indicates that the more transparent the central bank, the
more accountable it becomes. As shown in Figure 8, BoE is the most transparent
and accountable, with scores at 12.5 and 24 for transparency and accountability
respectively. It is followed by the ECB, the Fed, BoJ, and BI.

114
See Bini-Smaghi, L., & Gros, D. Is the ECB sufficiently accountable and transparent? Centre for European Policy Studies, 2001: 20.
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Figure 8 Transparency and Accountability Indices among Five Central Banks

Source: Dincer & Eichengreen (2010) and Bini-Smaghi & Gros (2001)

VII.CONCLUSION
It seems that the central bank of Indonesia has done a lot to meet the transparency
requirements which come along with the independence it has gained since the
enactment of the central bank law in 1999, and it seems that such efforts have been
paying off. Such circumstance is contrary to the fact that transparency in Indonesia, in
general, has been showing a decreasing trend as measured by, among other indicators,
the freedom index, corruption perception index, and economic freedom index. In
implementing the transparency notion, the central bank of Indonesia complies with
the regulatory framework that anchors in the Indonesian Constitution, namely the
second amendment of UUD 45, in particular Article 28F which deals with the right
to obtain information. The regulatory framework for central bank transparency
consists of Law Number 23 of 1999 concerning Bank Indonesia and Law Number 14
of 2008 regarding Public Information Transparency. In complying with the latter, the
central bank of Indonesia applies the designation principle derived from vrijwillige
onderwerping applicable to Indonesian private law.
The central bank of Indonesia was also scored very well on transparency index
initially developed by Eijffinger & Geraats. It was at 8.5 (scales from 0 to 15) and
ranked one of the best in the region, passing beyond Malaysia (at 5.5), Singapore (at
6.5), and Thailand (at 8). It is not so far from the most transparent central banks
such as the Bank of Japan (at 9.5) and the Federal Reserve System of USA (at 10),
although it is still at a distance from the Bank of England (at 12.5) and the European
Central Bank (at 11). The central bank performance in conducting monetary policy
also shows a rather good result, although, from the monthly data, the inflation is often
above the target, accounting for 50% of the total months in the last decade. However,
this has been mostly due to temporary shocks such as those caused by the increase
in oil price (for instance at the end of 2008 and early 2009, mid-2013, late 2014, and
early 2015). Furthermore, such result is even better compared to, for example, the
achievement of the European Central Bank during its first decade, which was 56%
above the target. All these results could indicate that, in general, the central bank
supports the government efforts to improve transparency and good governance in
Indonesia, which in turn can potentially benefit the country as a whole. However, to
claim that such results have a direct impact on the investment grade, for instance,
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would be too early. Further steps must be taken and detailed research must be
conducted to observe such effect.
Furthermore, the road ahead will be filled with more challenges. Firstly, learning
from the global crisis that hit Indonesian economy badly in 1998 and the US subprime
mortgage crisis in 2008 that caused the hot issues on the bailout of Century Bank,
it is most likely that crisis would lead to more challenges to the Indonesian central
bank in implementing its tasks. The central bank would be expected to increase its
transparency during the crisis. Secondly, Indonesian state organs are famous for having
a problem in cooperating with each other. With the establishment of some new bodies
with significant roles such as the Indonesian Deposit Insurance Institution (Lembaga
Penjaminan Simpanan/LPS) in 2004/2005 and OJK in 2014, transparency will be even
more challenging. Finally, as a crisis requires prompt actions from the government
and state organs including the central bank, cooperation and transparency between
the central bank and government in adopting a concrete policy during the crisis also
need to be strengthened.
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Appendices
1. Types of information provided by the central bank of Indonesia (Source: Bank Indonesia115
Timing

Periodic

Type of Information

Working plan
Profile of the central bank
- Objectives & functions
- Board of governors
- Organizational structure
- Law on Bank Indonesia
- Institutional relations

Numbers

157
1
20
4
1
1
1
1

Remarks
Total
Brief (infographic)
Sub total
Brief
Detail
Detail
Detail
Overview

115
Available at http://www.bi.go.id/id/lip/default.aspx (only in Bahasa Indonesia), last accessed on
February 10. 2016.
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Timing

Type of Information
- BI and the public

- Infographic of the report of access to
public information
- Contact details
- Library access
- Museum access
- Code of ethics and professional conduct
for BI officials
- Governance
- Personal property statements of BI
officials
Press-related information
- News
- Press release
- Speeches
- Agenda of the board
- Archives
- BI updates online
- Gallery of the board’s activities
- Ads and Video
Monetary policy related
- Objectives
- Framework (inflation targeting)
- Inflation
- Coordination to control the inflation
- JIBOR

- BI rate
- Decision-making process
- Monetary operation
- Monetary transmission
- Transparency & accountability
- Fiscal and monetary policy coordination
- Exchange rate
- Exchange rate calculator
- Monetary indicators
- Education
- Government bond
- Tender of SBI
- Interest rate of the deposit guarantees
- BI certificate of deposit tender
Financial stability related
- Banking
- Financial system
- Sharia banking
- Credit bureau
Payment systems related
- Indonesian payment systems
- Payment systems indicators
- Cash payment instruments
- Non-cash payment instruments
- Operational calendar
- Cashier services

Numbers

6
0
1
1
1
1
1
1

8
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
22
1
1
1
1
4
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
10
1
4
1
3
22
1
1
6
5
1
1

Remarks
Detail *except for information
entitled Public Information Services,
which is not available
Brief
Brief
Brief
Brief

Detail
Brief (via KPK)

Detail
Detail
Detail
Detail
Detail
Brief (via social media)
Detail
Detail (via YouTube)
Sub total
Brief
Brief
Brief
Brief
Detail*
*(JIBOR in USD is not available)
Brief
Brief
Detail
Brief
Detail
Brief
Brief
Detail
Brief
Detail
Overview
Detail
Brief
Detail
Sub total
Brief
Detail
Detail
Detail
Sub total
Brief
Brief
Detail
Detail
Brief
Brief
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Type of Information
- Settlement systems
- Education
- Licensing
Regulations
- Banking
- Monetary policy
- Payment systems
- Codification
- Search engine
- Archives
Publications
- Economic journal
- Annual reports
- Performance Reports to Parliament
- Monetary policy
- Balance of payments
- Banking and financial stability

Numbers

2
1
4
7
1
1
1
2
1
1
32
1
3
1
1
1
6

- Payment systems
- Finance & international cooperation
- Regional economic studies
- Articles and working papers
- Other publications
- Surveys
- Investor relation unit
- Information counter
Statistics
- Indonesian economy and finance
- Selected monetary and payment systems
indicators
- Regional
- Banking

2
1
1
1
3
9
1
1
20
1
1

- Payment systems
- Foreign debt
- Special Data Dissemination Standard
- Foreign exchange
- Banking daily reports
- Metadata
Small medium enterprises
- Overview
- Cooperation
- Consultation
- Feasibility
- Cluster development
- Loans
- Success stories

8
1
1
1
1
1
20
1
2
1
3
4
3
1

1
4

Remarks
Detail
Detail
Detail
Sub total
Detail
Detail
Detail
Detail
Detail
Detail
Sub total
Detail
Detail
Detail
Detail
Detail
Detail*
*) micro prudential supervision
has been shifted to the OJK since
31 Dec 2013. The data/reports
displayed are up to 31 Dec 2014.
Detail
Detail
Detail
Detail
Detail
Detail
Detail
Detail
Sub total
Detail
Detail

Detail
Detail*)
*) some parts of the detailed
banking statistics have been
shifted to the OJK since Dec. 31,
2013. The data/reports displayed
are up to Dec 31, 2014.
Detail
Detail
Detail
Detail
Detail
Detail
Detail
Brief
Detail
Brief
Detail
Detail
Detail
Detail
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Timing

Prompt

Type of Information
- Research
- Commodity data
- External links
Other Information
- Procedures of access to public
information
- Whistleblower system
- Procurements
N/A

At any time

A list of public information
Regulation, decision and policy
- Regulation
- Banking
- Monetary policy
- Payment systems
- Codifications
- Search engine
- Archives
- Decision or policy
Performance reports
- Annual report
- Performance Reports to Parliament
- Monetary policy
- Balance of Payments Indonesia
- Financial Economics & International
Cooperation
- Regional Economic Analysis
- Publications
- Statistics
- Surveys
- Investor Relation Unit
- Information counter
BI Policy in general
Access to public information services
Journals and Research
Press-related information
- News
- Press release
- Speeches
- Agenda of the board
- Archives
- BI updates online
- Gallery of the board’s activities
- Ads and Video

Numbers

Remarks

2
2
1
2
1

Detail
Detail
Brief

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
8
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Detail
Detail
Detail
Detail
Detail
Detail
Brief
Detail
Detail
Sub total
Detail
Detail
Detail
Detail
Detail
Brief (via social media)
Detail
Detail (via YouTube)

0
1
0
33
0
9
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
12
2
1
1
1
1
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Brief

Detail
Detail
Total
Total
Sub total
Sub total
Detail
Detail
Detail
Detail
Detail
Detail
Detail
Detail
Sub total
Detail
Detail
Detail
Detail
Detail

2. Report of public information services of Bank Indonesia, 2015
Source: Bank Indonesia116

116

Available at http://www.bi.go.id/id/lip/laporan/Default.aspxa, last accessed on February 10, 2016.
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